Empires and Barbarians Page 3

  North of the forested steppe, the eastern reaches of the North European Plain are swathed in vast stretches of increasingly coniferous forest. Here, as average winter temperatures fall lower and there is less humus in the soil, conditions become much tougher for farming. It was a world little known to the Mediterranean at the start of the first millennium. In his Germania, Tacitus places the hunter-gatherer Fenni (Finns) in the far north, and another group, the Veneti (or Venethi), between them and the Germanic Peucini on the fringes of the Carpathians:

  The Veneti have taken a great many customs from the Sarmatians, for in plundering forays they roam through all the forests and hills that rise between the Peucini and Fenni. Still, they are more properly classed as Germani, because they have fixed homes and bear shields and take pleasure in moving fast by foot.

  Pliny, a little earlier, had likewise heard of the Venedae, as he names them, but reports no detailed information, and even the second-century geographer Ptolemy knew little more about them than a few of their group names. The area was a touch less mysterious than what lay beyond, where people had ‘human faces and features, but the bodies and limbs of beasts’, but only just.

  Archaeologically, the picture of the inhabitants of these wooded and forested zones of eastern Europe around the birth of Christ is reasonably straightforward. As Tacitus’ comment about permanent settlements implies, it was a world of farmers, but farmers with an extremely simple material culture, less developed even than that prevailing further west in Germanic Europe. The remains of its pottery, tools and settlement are so simple, in fact, that they frustrate any attempt at stylistic or even chronological categorization, being extremely slow to change before the second half of the first millennium AD. This archaeological evidence suggests that it was a world of small, isolated farming settlements, operating at a lower subsistence level than the Germani, with little sign of any surplus, and none of trade links with the richer world of the Mediterranean to the south. The ethnic and linguistic identity of these forest-dwelling Veneti has generated much discussion, in particular regarding their relationship, if any, with the Slavic-speakers who become so prominent in European history after about 500 AD. We will return to this discussion in Chapter 8, but it would appear that the likeliest place to find Slavs – or their most direct ancestors – at the birth of Christ was somewhere among these simple farming populations of the easternmost stretches of the Great European Plain.7

  With only a little simplification, therefore, barbarian Europe at the start of our period can be divided into three main zones. Furthest west and closest to the Mediterranean was the most developed, with the highest levels of agricultural productivity and a material culture that in its pottery and metalwork was already rich and sophisticated. This had long been controlled largely by Celtic-speakers, and much of it had just been brought under Roman rule. Further east lay Germanic-dominated Europe, where agriculture was less intensive, and which consequently lacked the same richness of material culture. Even Germanic Europe practised a relatively intensive agriculture, however, compared with the inhabitants of the woods and forests of eastern Europe, whose material culture has left correspondingly minimal remains. Nothing in this brief survey is really controversial, except, perhaps, where Slavs might be found. What has become highly disputable, however, is the role played by migration in the astounding transformation of barbarian Europe which unfolded over the next thousand years.

  Barbarian Migration and the First Millennium

  That some migration occurred within and out of barbarian Europe in the first millennium would be accepted by everyone. The big picture, however, is now very polemical. Before the Second World War, migration was seen as a phenomenon of overwhelming importance in the transformation of barbarian Europe: a spinal column giving the millennium its distinctive shape. Large-scale Germanic migration in the fourth and fifth centuries brought down the western Roman Empire, and established new linguistic and cultural patterns in the north. This was the era when Goths from the northern Black Sea littoral moved over two thousand kilometres to south-western France in three discrete leaps over a thirty-five-year period (c.376–411 AD). Vandals from central Europe went nearly twice that distance and crossed the Mediterranean to end up, again after three discrete moves, in the central provinces of Roman North Africa. This took thirty-three years (c.406–39), including a lengthy sojourn in Spain (411–c.430). It was in these centuries, too, that the history of the British Isles took a decisive turn with the arrival of Anglo-Saxon immigrants from Denmark and northern Germany.

  Of greater importance still, arguably, was Slavic migration. Slavic origins were always hotly debated, but, wherever they came from, there was no doubting the fact that from relative obscurity in the sixth century Slavic-speakers spread across vast tracts of central and eastern Europe over the next two hundred years. Substantial parts of this landscape had previously been dominated by Germanic-speakers, so the rise of the Slavs represented a huge cultural and political shift. It created the third major linguistic zone of modern Europe alongside the Romance and Germanic tongues, and the boundaries between the three have remained little altered since they were first created. Scandinavian migration in the ninth and tenth centuries then completed a millennium of mass migration. In the Atlantic, entirely new landscapes were colonized for the first time in Iceland and the Faroes, while Viking migrants in western Europe established Danelaw in England and the Duchy of Normandy on the continent. Further east, other Scandinavian settlers played a key role in creating the first, Kievan, Russian state, whose limits established and delineated the boundaries of Europe down to the modern era.8

  No single view of any of these migrations and their significance ever won universal acceptance. Many of the details, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, have always been and will remain highly controversial. But the conviction that barbarian migration played a hugely formative role in the history of Europe in the first millennium was a distinctive feature of all European scholarly traditions up to 1945. It was true of history on the very grandest scale. Here first-millennium migrants were seen as establishing the main linguistic divides of modern Europe: between its Romance-, Germanic-, and Slavic-speaking populations. But migration was given a critical role at more intimate levels too. Particular sets of migrants were considered to have laid the foundations of such long-lived and geographically widespread political entities as England, France, Poland and Russia, not to mention all the Slavic states who clawed their way to independence from Europe’s multinational empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the interwar era, the proportion of modern European nation states who traced the origins of their distinctiveness back to first-millennium migrants was staggering. This shared vision of the past is what more recent scholarship has come to call a Grand Narrative. Argument never ceased over the details, but that didn’t really matter. The important point was that so many of the population groupings of modern Europe considered the roots of their own distinctiveness to lie in a continuous history stretching back to a migratory moment somewhere in that specific thousand years.9

  An integral part of this narrative was a particular vision of the nature of the population units doing the migrating. Many of these moves were not well documented in the historical sources, some not at all. But what historical information there was did sometimes talk of large, compact groups of men, women and children moving together in highly deliberate fashion from one habitat to the next. This information struck a chord. Since the migrant groups were seen as the start of something big – entities with a long future of continuous distinctiveness ahead of them leading inexorably to the nations of modern Europe – it was natural to apply this vision to them all. Thus all the migrant groups of the first millennium – documented or not – came to be viewed as large, culturally distinctive and biologically self-reproducing population groupings which moved, happily unaffected by the migratory process, from point A to point B on the map. These distant ancestors had to be numerous and distinctive
enough to explain the existence of their many and now politically self-assertive descendants in the modern era. A good analogy for the migration process envisaged might be billiard balls rolling around the green baize table. Something might make the balls roll from one part of the table to another – overpopulation at the point of departure was the usual suspect – but any one ball was straightforwardly the same ball in a different place when the movement had finished. This view was applied particularly to Germanic groups involved in the action of the fourth to sixth centuries, but also to a considerable extent to Slavs and Scandinavians as well. Modern Slavic groupings such as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, for instance, all traced their history back to coherent migratory populations of the first millennium.10

  This first-millennium narrative was itself part of a still grander narrative accounting for the whole peopling of Europe in prehistoric times. The birth of Christ marked the moment when written historical information started to become more or less available for large parts of Europe north of the Alps. Reconstructing the more distant past relied entirely upon archaeological evidence and tended to be written up – before 1945 – in terms of a sequence of ‘more advanced’ population groups succeeding one another as the dominant force in the European landscape. The first farmers of the late Stone Age arrived from the east to displace the hunter-gatherers, the copper users did the same for the stone users, the bronzesmiths for the copper users, until eventually we reached the Iron Age and the first millennium AD. The details of this bigger picture do not concern us, but to understand what follows it is necessary to realize that a migration model taken from some first-millennium texts – one where coherent groups of men, women and children moved intentionally to take over landscapes – was imported back into the deeper past, wholesale, to explain the developing patterns of archaeological remains from prehistoric Europe. It was because of what people thought they knew about first-millennium migration that the first farmers, then subsequently those who worked copper, bronze and iron, were all viewed – successively – as outside population groups moving in to take over the European landscape.11 Within this grandest of all grand narratives about the peopling of Europe, our period represented an end and a beginning. It saw the last in the sequence of major migrations by which the whole history of the continent had been shaped since the last Ice Age, and marked the start of a Europe peopled by entities with a continuous history – that’s to say, groupings largely untouched by further migration – down to the present. It also provided the migration model by which all of this European history was ordered. Its sheer prevalence is the key to understanding the virulence of subsequent intellectual response.

  THE GREAT MIGRATION DEBATE

  Since 1945, so many key elements of this migration-driven narrative of the European past have been challenged that the old certainties have been eroded. In some parts of Europe, the narrative continues broadly to hold sway, but particularly in English-speaking academic circles, migration has been relegated to a walk-on part in a historical drama that is now largely about internally driven transformation. This intellectual revolution has been so dramatic, and its effects on more recent accounts of first-millennium migration so profound, that none of what follows will make sense without some understanding of its major outlines. A key starting point is the completely new understanding, which emerged in the postwar era, of how human beings come together to form larger social units.

  Identity Crisis

  It may seem strange that the first port of call in thinking about migration should be group identity, but the old grand narrative of European history has ensured that migration and identity are inextricably linked, at least when it comes to the first millennium AD. This is for two basic reasons. First, the billiard ball model of migration that powered this narrative assumed that human beings always came in compact groupings of men, women and children who were essentially closed to outsiders and reproduced themselves by endogamy (marrying someone who was already a member of the group). Second, in what is essentially the same view of group identity played out over the long term, it was presumed that there was a direct and tangible continuity between immigrant groups of the first millennium and similarly named nations of modern Europe. Thus the Poles were the direct descendants of the Slavic Polani, the English of Anglo-Saxons, and so forth. National identities were ancient, unchanging ‘facts’, and their antiquity gave them a legitimacy which overrode the claims of any other form of political organization. Where they did not prevail as the prime mode of political organization, then some other power structure (such as the old multinational empires of central and eastern Europe) had in the meantime erected itself by the illegitimate use of force, and needed to be overturned. Both assumptions have been shown to be flawed.

  Nazi atrocities played a key role in stimulating historians to think again about the presumption – generated at the height of European nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – that nations had always existed, and were the fundamentally correct way to organize larger human communities. In Nazi hands, these ideas led straight to claims for Lebensraum, based on how much of Europe the ancient Germani had once controlled, and, with the added dimension of claimed German racial superiority, to the horror of the death camps. Historians would probably have got there anyway at some point, but the excesses of runaway nationalism provided a powerful stimulus to corrective reflection. On closer examination, the assumption that ancient and modern speakers of related languages somehow share a common and continuous political identity has proved unsustainable. The kinds of national identities that came to the fore in nineteenth-century Europe were created in historical time, and did not represent the re-emergence of something fundamental but long submerged. Without the kind of mass communications that became available in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it would have been totally impossible to bind together numerically huge and geographically dispersed populations into national communities. Group identity simply did not function in the same way in earlier eras without canals, railways and newspapers, a world where ‘country’ meant ‘county’, for instance, for the vast majority of the British population. The creation of modern nationalism also required the conscious input of intellectuals, who created national dictionaries, identified national costumes, and collected the dances and folktales which were then used to ‘measure’ ethnicity (I’ve always thought of these men as looking a bit like Professor Calculus out of Tintin). These same individuals then also generated the educational programmes that solidified the elements of national culture that they had identified into a self-reproducing cultural complex which could be taught at school, and by that means reach a still larger body of humanity in an era when mass primary education was rapidly becoming – for the first time – a European norm. The emergence of nationalism is a great story in itself, and has rightly attracted a lot of attention in the last generation or so of scholarship. The point for us, though, is straightforward. Europe has not been peopled since the first millennium by large blocks of population conscious of distinct nationalist affiliations which fundamentally shaped their lives and activities. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century affiliations cannot be imposed on the deeper past.12

  Feeding into this reconsideration of the nationalist phenomenon was an equally revolutionary set of conclusions emerging from the work of social scientists studying exactly how, and how strongly, individual human beings are ever attached to any kind of group identity. In this field, the world was turned upside down in the 1950s by an anthropologist called Edmund Leach, who investigated how identity worked in the hills of northern Burma. Leach was able to show that an individual’s group identity does not necessarily vary with measurable cultural traits, whether material (types of houses or pottery, for example) or non-material (shared social values, belief systems and so on). People sharing the same set of measurable cultural traits (including language: the great symbol of group identity in the nationalist era) can think of themselves as belonging to different social groups, a
nd people with different cultures can think of themselves as belonging to the same ones. Fundamentally, therefore, identity is about perception, not a check-list of measurable items: the perception of identity the individual has inside his or her head, and the way that individual is perceived by others. Cultural items may express an identity, but they do not define it. A Scotsman may wear a kilt, but he remains a Scotsman even if he doesn’t.

  As a great deal of further work has confirmed, this suggests an entirely different view of the bonds that create human group identities from that which prevailed before the Second World War. Up to 1945, identity was viewed as an unchanging given, a defining aspect of any individual’s life. But studies inspired by Leach’s work have shown both that an individual’s group identity can and does change, and that a particular individual can have more than one group identity, sometimes even choosing between them according to immediate advantage. In our post-nationalist world, this seems less surprising than it might have done sixty years ago. My sons will have both American and British passports, where before 1991 they would have had to opt for one or the other at eighteen (at that point you could be a joint American citizen only with Israel and Ireland – an interesting combination); EC citizens have both their home-national and a European identity. And instead of being seen, as used to be the case, as an overriding determinant of life choices, group identity is now sometimes relegated to a much more minor role. Particularly influential in first-millennium studies, for instance, has been a set of essays published by the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrick Barth in 1969. The collective view emerging from these papers portrays identity as no more than a strategy for personal advancement. As circumstances change, making first one group identity then another more advantageous, the individual will vary his or her allegiance. As Barth famously characterized it in the introduction to these essays, group identity must be understood as an ‘evanescent situational construct, not a solid enduring fact’.13